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The Concept of Voluntariness 
Ben Colburn  
 
Published in Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2008): 101-111. 
 
 
In her work on the distinction between freedom and voluntariness, Serena Olsaretti suggests 
the following definition of voluntary action: an action is voluntary if it is not non-voluntary, 
and non-voluntary if it is performed because there are no acceptable alternatives, where 
‘acceptable’ means conformity to some objective standard (which Olsaretti suggests might be 
well-being).1 Freedom, by contrast, is defined as pure negative liberty: an agent is free to 
perform an action if there exists no preventing condition on their doing so, and free simpliciter 
if she has a number of actions that she is free to perform.2 
Olsaretti’s notion of voluntariness is important for two reasons. Olsaretti herself suggests 
that ascriptions of responsibility are underwritten by judgments of voluntariness, rather than 
freedom.3
 
Hence, agents cannot be held responsible for actions performed non-voluntarily, 
even if they are free. This she takes to undermine libertarian positions on, for example, 
hazardous employment.4
 
Moreover, Olsaretti notes that a concern for voluntary choice might 
be grounded in respect for autonomy, understood as an ideal of self-determination or 
‘[directing] oneself where different directions are possible’.
5 
I suggest (though will not here 
argue) that one must be able to make voluntary choices if one is to live an autonomous life. 
This means that two important questions in political philosophy – when an agent is 
responsible for her actions and what we must do if we want agents to live autonomous lives – 
hang upon whether Olsaretti’s account of voluntariness is correct once it has been developed 
                                                 
1 Most recently in S. Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), p.139. See 
also ‘Freedom, force and choice: against the rights-based definition of voluntariness’, The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1998), 53–78; and ‘The value of freedom and freedom of choice’, 
Politeia 56 (2000): 114–121. Olsaretti rejects a subjective standard (such as, for example, that 
something is acceptable just in case I consider it acceptable) since using the latter would lead to 
the unpalatable conclusion that whether we act voluntary (and hence whether we are 
responsible) would also be subjective (Olsaretti [2004] p.154.) Olsaretti might appeal to 
familiar intuitions to show this. Imagine someone who thinks that champagne is the only 
acceptable beverage. If by an acceptable alternative we mean a subjectively acceptable 
alternative, then our fastidious protagonist acts non-voluntarily in (and is not responsible for) 
in choosing to drink champagne at a party, and he is not responsible for his choice. If this 
seems perverse, then we should also prefer an objective standard of acceptability. 
2 In [2004] Olsaretti illustrates the distinction as follows (pp.138-9). Daisy lives in a city 
surrounded by desert. She desires to leave, but knows she would not survive the journey 
through the sands, and therefore chooses to stay. Daisy is free to leave – nobody prevents her 
– but acts non-voluntarily, since she stays only because all other possibilities would be fatal. By 
contrast, Wendy lives contentedly in a city surrounded by an impenetrable wire fence. Since 
she can do nothing but stay in the city, Wendy is unfree; but she does so voluntarily because 
her reason for staying is not that there are no acceptable alternatives. 
3 Olsaretti [2004]: p.139. 
4 ibid. ch.6 
5 T. Hurka, ‘Why value autonomy?’, Social Theory and Practice 13 (1987): 361-380.  
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in detail. 
This paper is a contribution to that development. I show that well-informedness about our 
options is crucial to whether we act voluntarily or not, and I argue that we should restrict the 
scope of what we consider relevantly unacceptable only to include things which involve 
serious prudential harm. Inevitably there are some questions left unanswered, but what follows 
indicates what I take to be the strongest form of Olsaretti’s theory, and one which can play the 
role described for it above. 
 
1 Voluntariness and Belief 
 
On Olsaretti’s definition, an agent acts non-voluntarily if they act because all other alternatives 
are unacceptable. Whether an act is voluntary or not therefore depends upon the motivation 
for an agent’s action; and hence upon an agent’s beliefs about their options. If those beliefs are 
incorrect, then an agent can in fact have several acceptable alternatives to an action, but it might 
nevertheless be non-voluntary due to her ill-informedness.  
To show this, consider the following cases.  
 
1. A bank manager called Hilda is threatened with a gun and told to open the safe. Hilda 
complies, believing that refusal will result in a swift death. Hilda believes that the gun 
was loaded. As it happens, though, the gun is empty.  
2. Later, another bank manager called Grace is threatened by the same robber. Having 
heard Hilda’s story Grace believes that the gun is not loaded; but since she dislikes her 
employers she opens the safe anyway. This time, the gun was loaded.  
 
In case 1, it was not true that Hilda had no acceptable alternatives: unbeknownst to her, she 
could have defied her assailants and stopped the robbery. However, she acted as she did 
because she (mistakenly) believed the gun to be loaded, and hence that she had no acceptable 
alternatives. On Olsaretti’s definition, Hilda acted non-voluntarily. The converse is true in 2. 
Grace really had no acceptable alternatives to opening the safe: if she had done anything else, 
she would have been shot. However, Grace did not act as she did for that reason, because she 
didn’t know that the gun was loaded. Her action, therefore, was voluntary by Olsaretti’s lights.  
That beliefs about one’s options can have this effect means that Olsaretti’s view is a hybrid, 
containing both objective and subjective conditions for voluntariness. What counts as 
acceptable and unacceptable does not depend upon an agent’s beliefs, but an agent’s 
motivation does so depend. Hence, in deciding whether an agent acts voluntarily, we must 
look at what they believe their options to be, their evaluation of those options, and whether 
they use an appropriate standard for that evaluation.6 This gives well-informedness a crucial 
                                                 
6 Someone who believes that only champagne is acceptable might correctly perceive that all 
non-champagne drinks are not champagne; but the standard he uses to evaluate his options is 
inappropriate. Hence, his drinking champagne is voluntary. Hilda, by contrast, has false beliefs 
about her options but uses an appropriate standard; so, she acts non-voluntarily. It might be 
objected that if (unlike Hilda) one is responsible for being ignorant of acceptable alternatives, 
one is responsible for actions performed in that ignorance. I disagree: if an agent acts on the 
sincere (but mistaken) belief that she has no acceptable alternatives, then at the time she makes 
that choice it makes no difference to either her voluntariness or responsibility whether she 
could at an earlier time have become better informed. We might hold her culpable for that 
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role in providing the conditions for voluntary choice. If an agent is not even aware that there 
exist more options than one, then they are unlikely to be able to act voluntarily; and becoming 
better-informed about an option can mean an agent realises that they were wrong to think it 
unacceptable. 7 
Olsaretti observes that if we want to promote opportunities for an agent to act voluntarily, 
then we cannot simply increase her freedom by giving her more options: those options must 
be acceptable ones. To this we can add: the agent must also be well-informed about the extent 
and nature of those options.  
                                                                                                                                                 
earlier omission, but that is a separate appraisal. Thanks to Tom Porter for this objection. 
7 This does not mean that being well-informed always promotes voluntariness: in ignorance I 
may believe that an option is acceptable when greater knowledge would tell me that it is not. 
As Olsaretti says, we would have to make sure that the options are indeed genuinely acceptable. 
 
2 Standards of Acceptability  
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What counts as objectively unacceptable? My conclusion in the previous section might suggest 
that we need not have a single standard by which options are judged, so long as those 
standards are objective. So, should we say that an option is unacceptable in the relevant sense 
if there is anything that makes it objectively unacceptable? Olsaretti herself, though she 
tentatively suggests that we use a standard specifically of well-being, gives the impression that 
it is just its objectivity that makes well-being an appropriate standard.8
 
Here, I argue that 
Olsaretti’s hint is right, and take a more restrictive line: only prudential unacceptability counts 
in deciding whether an action is non-voluntary. 
The problem with taking any objective unacceptability to be relevant for voluntariness is 
that it implies that many moral choices (by which I mean choices made for moral reasons) are 
non-voluntary. Such choices involve recognising that only one course of action is acceptable. 
Suppose, for example, that I am a strong swimmer walking past a shallow pond when I see a 
baby drowning. Naturally, I choose to jump in and save the baby, and it seems that I do so 
because no other possible course of action is acceptable. 
Such cases as this reveal a general feature of overall (as opposed to prima facie) moral 
demands: when faced with a choice between an act demanded (overall) by morality and an act 
not so demanded, it would be unacceptable to choose the latter. Therefore, if Olsaretti’s 
definition is unrestricted, such moral choices are non-voluntary, and we are not responsible for 
them. 
We could respond to this argument in three ways. First, we might take it to cast doubt upon 
the link between voluntariness and responsibility. I do not explore this possibility here, for it 
would still leave us the problem that moral acts like this are ipso facto non-voluntary (though I 
say more about it below).  The second and third responses are to embrace the conclusion — 
that is, to agree that moral choices are non-voluntary and that we’re not responsible for them 
— or to find some principled way to restrict what counts as relevantly unacceptable. Later I 
shall consider and reject the second response; here, I shall suggest a modification to the theory 
that allows us to use the third response.  
There are two ways in which an option might be unacceptable. First, an option may mean 
serious specific damage to the agent, such as starving to death in the case of Daisy. Second, 
certain moral demands by their nature make all other possible actions unacceptable. The first 
type of unacceptability relies on prudential concerns, the second on moral concerns.9
 
Let us 
call ‘morally unacceptable’ those options which are ruled out in the way I described above: 
some choices are required by morality in such a way as to make any other option unacceptable. 
Let us call ‘prudentially unacceptable’ those options which involve what I am loosely calling 
‘serious specific damage’. In what follows I suggest that reflection upon our intuitions about 
prudentially unacceptable options suggests a principled way of excluding moral unacceptability 
as a cause of non-voluntariness.  
Suppose that we ask ourselves precisely why having no acceptable alternatives is supposed 
to undermine the voluntariness of our choices. To say that an option is unacceptable is roughly 
to say that there is some feature of it that effectively bars us from choosing it. What sort of 
                                                 
8 Olsaretti [2004]: p.140. 
9 One might be uncomfortable with this stark separation between moral and prudential 
concerns: various people have taken how morally good or bad ones life is to be relevant to 
well-being. For such people, I suggest a terminological alteration: there is a distinction between 
immediate serious loss of prudential value and the sort of loss that comes about as the result of 
immorality, and only the former is relevant to judgments of voluntariness. 
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feature might this be? In most of the paradigm cases of non-voluntary action, it is that the 
other options involve bringing our well-being below a certain threshold. Daisy’s alternatives to 
staying in the desert city all involve dying of thirst. Hilda, when she faces the robber, believes 
that she would end up with a bullet through her head if she were to resist. In such cases, we 
might say that it is the prospect of awful personal consequences that acts as the instrument of 
force: it is because we cannot face such a loss of well-being that we have to choose in a 
particular way.  
If the other options are morally unacceptable, though, it is hard to identify a similar 
instrument of force. Hence, there is no factor analogous to that which in the presence of 
prudential unacceptability grounds our judgment that a choice has been made non-voluntary. 
In most such cases, there will not be dreadful consequences for us if we do not do the moral act, 
and in those cases where there are, the moral demand doesn’t depend on their presence.10 In 
cases where there is just a moral demand and no prudential concerns, there is nothing that 
constitutes force in the way that the prospect of awful consequences does in prudential cases. 
Hence, we should not say that voluntariness is undermined in such cases, even though they are 
situations where we act because there is no acceptable alternative to the moral choice. This 
gives us a principled reason to say that only prudential unacceptability is relevant to questions 
of voluntariness: and that allows us to avoid the implication that moral choices are 
non-voluntary.11  
Precisely what this amounts to depends upon a more detailed account of prudential value, 
and I can here offer only a sketch of such an account. First, if it is to be plausible our definition 
of prudential value must include not only the well-being of the agent in question, but also other 
people whose well-being that agent takes for her own. Secondly, to render an option 
unacceptable, the loss involved would have to be above a threshold beyond which it would be 
unreasonable to expect someone to bear it; and each option would have to be considered 
unacceptable on its own merits rather than by comparison with other members of the set.12 
That is, an action is not non-voluntary if it is chosen to avoid any harm, however insignificant; 
and an option cannot be made unacceptable simply by there existing another option which is 
                                                 
10 I don’t, for example, think that I ought to save the baby because I might otherwise get 
lynched. 
11 Strictly speaking, this means I should amend the definition of non-voluntary action as 
follows: an act is non-voluntary if it is performed only because the other options are 
prudentially unacceptable. This addresses a problem (suggested by an anonymous referee) 
with overdetermined acts – are acts performed both because the other options are prudentially 
unacceptable and because morality demands it voluntary or not? On my theory, they are. 
Overdetermination of motivation is the satisfaction of multiple sufficient conditions for a 
given action, and the satisfaction of another sufficient condition (such as acting from moral 
duty) would mean that one is not acting only to avoid prudentially unacceptable alternatives. Of 
course, it may be practically very difficult to know in a particular case whether such a situation 
obtained. 
12 It has been suggested that the moral work might all be done by considering what costs we 
can reasonably expect a person to bear, rendering the notion of voluntariness redundant. I 
disagree, based on the role I noted in the previous section for an agent’s beliefs and 
motivations. Even if an agent acts with no alternatives we could reasonably expect her to bear, 
she might nevertheless act voluntarily, depending on her reasons for acting. Thanks to 
Hallvard Lillehammer and Serena Olsaretti for the concern. 
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so prudentially advantageous that choosing the first would be irrational. 
These reflections are admittedly brief, but they do suffice to establish most of the 
philosophical constraints that would have to be borne in mind in providing a more substantial 
account. However in fact we determine the scope of what counts as prudentially unacceptable, 
an option must be unacceptable in this sense if it is to threaten the voluntariness of our 
actions.13 
                                                 
13 What should we say about choices made on long-term prudential grounds? For example, 
someone might give up heavy drinking because all alternatives lead to an early grave. Is the 
decision to give up the bottle non-voluntary one? I suggest that we say ‘no’. A principled 
distinction can be drawn between short-term choices about what we do right now, and 
long-term choices about what we intend to do in the future. The latter involve both immediate 
short-term choices and also intentions about the short-term choices we will make in the future. 
So, a recovering alcoholic both decides now to eschew a drink, and intends to do so whenever 
the choice arises. A long-term choice is non-voluntary just in case its present short-term 
component is non-voluntary. In some cases, however dreadful the eventual prudential harm, 
this will not be the case: continuing to drink will eventually kill our alcoholic, but it is unlikely 
that one more drink will do so by itself.  
 
3 Moral choices 
 
In arguing that only prudential unacceptability is relevant to judgments of voluntariness, I left 
open the possibility that there might be an acceptable sense in which we do say that moral 
choices are non-voluntary. A critic might therefore say that, contrary to my suggestions above, 
we needn’t restrict the scope of what counts as relevantly unacceptable. Here, I consider and 
reject that possibility. 
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At one point, Olsaretti discusses the difference between two senses of voluntariness.14
 
First, 
there is the sense defined above, meaning actions performed not because there is no 
reasonable alternative. Second, actions can be voluntary in the sense of being the result of an 
appropriate process of reasoning. Quoting Bernard Williams, she says that a voluntary act in 
this sense is ‘intentional in the relevant respect and . . . to the extent that the agent deliberated, 
is the product of deliberation’.15
 
These two senses of voluntariness (she says) correspond to 
two different notions of responsibility identified by Scanlon.16
 
Voluntariness in the first sense 
— having been performed not because there were no acceptable alternatives — corresponds 
to a notion of substantive responsibility, which ‘has to do with the obligations people have 
towards each other’ and holding agents liable for their actions. An agent substantively 
responsible for an outcome, says Scanlon, is one who ‘cannot complain of the burdens or 
obligations that result’.17
 
Voluntariness in the second sense — being the result of a process of 
deliberation — corresponds to what Olsaretti calls ‘moral responsibility’, and what Scanlon 
calls either that or ‘attributability’, which is the quality required for us to attribute an action to 
an agent, and thereby make them an appropriate subject for praise or blame.18
 
 
Someone might therefore say that it is not as unintuitive as it first seems to say that if a 
choice is made for moral reasons it is ipso facto non-voluntary. A moral choice can be 
non-voluntary in Olsaretti’s sense, but voluntary in Williams’ sense (because it is the product of 
deliberation). Therefore, an agent who acts morally can be morally responsible (liable to praise 
and blame) without being substantively responsible (liable to punishment). Perhaps our 
intuition that moral actions are voluntary is sufficiently captured by saying that they are 
voluntary in Williams’ sense; and so saying that they are non-voluntary in Olsaretti’s sense is 
more palatable. To illustrate, suppose that in saving the baby from the pond, I ruin my 
wristwatch. I am still owed praise for saving the baby (because my action was voluntary in 
Williams’ sense) but I might think I deserve compensation for losing my watch, since I had to 
do what I did (because my action was non-voluntary in Olsaretti’s sense). If we were prepared 




In my view, this argument fails for three reasons. First, it depends upon our being satisfied 
with Scanlon’s distinction between substantive and moral responsibility. Secondly, it relies 
upon an inconclusive inference to the best explanation of our intuitions. Thirdly, it is at best an 
invitation to us to bite the bullet. 
Scanlon’s distinction is doubly problematic: it is clear neither what the distinction actually is 
nor that it is morally significant. To start with, Scanlon never gives a clear characterization of 
the distinction. In one place he says that moral and substantive responsibility are, respectively, 
the ‘basis for moral appraisal’ and that which grounds ‘substantive claims about what people 
are required ... to do for each other.’20 This gives us only the role that each concept plays in 
                                                 
14 Olsaretti [2004]: p.158. 
15 B. Williams, ` Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 10 (1990): 
1-10. 
16 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) 
ch.6. 
17 Scanlon [1998]: p.290. 
18 Olsaretti [2004]: p.158; Scanlon [1998]: pp.248-51. 
19 This line of thought was suggested by Olsaretti. 
20 Scanlon [1998]: p.248. 
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moral reasoning, and not the explanation we need of the concepts themselves.21
 
Elsewhere, 
Scanlon says that moral responsibility depends upon ‘determining whether a given action did 
or did not reflect that agent’s judgment-sensitive attitudes’, while substantive responsibility 
depends upon an agent ‘having their actions and what happens to them depend upon and 
reflect their choices and other responses.’ 22
 
This, though, is obscure, and does little to 
illuminate the distinction being drawn.  
Neither is much light shed by examining the examples used to argue that our intuitions 
support his thesis. Scanlon’s main example, drawn from Aristotle, concerns a group of sailors 
who jettison the cargo of their ship to avoid their ship being sunk in a storm.23
 
Scanlon says 
that this is an example of a situation where we have two divergent intuitions about 
responsibility: the sailors’ choice can be attributed to them (i.e. they are morally responsible), 
but they are not blameworthy. 24
 
This contradicts Scanlon’s assertion elsewhere that 
blameworthiness depends on moral rather than substantial responsibility.25
 
How might we 
interpret this passage?  
One possibility is that attributability is not an actual moral appraisal, but rather is the 
precondition for moral appraisal: an action must be attributable to an agent if that agent is to 
be appraised, or indeed to be held substantively responsible for it. It is consistent to say that 
the sailors satisfy the preconditions for blameworthiness because their acts can be attributed to 
them, but to deny that they are in fact blameworthy.26 If this is what the distinction consists in, 
then the sense in which one is still responsible for moral choices becomes perilously thin; and 
the thinner the notion of responsibility, the more implausible becomes the claim that we are 
not responsible for our moral choices in the other sense. Even worse, on this reading of 
Scanlon actual attributions would just track judgments of substantive responsibility. This 
brings us back to where we started: even if only substantive responsibility is undermined by 
non-voluntariness in Olsaretti’s sense, we would still have to conclude that our moral choices 
cannot be praiseworthy. 
Faced with this, we might think that Scanlon’s statement that the sailors are not 
‘blameworthy’ was a slip of his pen, and that he in fact meant to suggest that they are morally 
but not substantively responsible. Or, indeed, that he meant it to illustrate the effect that 
duress has upon his two types of responsibility: it undermines substantive responsibility but 
not attributability, instead just changing the ‘character of what can be attributed.’ 27 This 
multiplicity of interpretations just goes to underline the fact that Scanlon’s appeal to intuitions 
is indeterminate: and since his argument depends upon taking the distinction to be the best 
explanation of our intuitions, that indeterminacy is fatal. There are other ways we might 
explain our intuitions in the case – Aristotle himself pointed to the case to indicate that there 
are actions which seem to bear the hallmarks of both voluntary and involuntary action, rather 
                                                 
21 By analogy, suppose I tried to explain the distinction between petty and high treason by 
saying that the first grounds life imprisonment and the second is the basis for execution: this 
would say nothing about what the offences actually are. 
22 Scanlon [1998]: p.291. 
23 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics 1110a9-19, ed. R. Crisp (Cambridge: CUP). 
24 Scanlon [1998]: p.280. 
25 ibid.: p.248. 
26 Thanks to Robert Adams for this suggestion. 
27 Scanlon [1998]: p.279. Thanks to Serena Olsaretti for this suggestion.  
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than that the sailors are both responsible and not responsible for their actions.28
 
 Scanlon’s 
claim that we can separate ascriptions of blameworthiness and substantive responsibility is just 
one of the various possible conclusions. If one already understands and accepts that 
distinction, then one might indeed take Aristotle’s case as more evidence in favour of that 
distinction playing a significant role, but without that prior acceptance the case provides little 
reason for the sceptic to change their mind.  
I could run through other examples that Scanlon raises, but the general point is the same in 
each. Insofar as each case is supposed to provoke certain intuitions, the best explanation for 
which is the implicit recognition of a distinction between moral and substantive responsibility, 
the strategy fails. The cases fail either to illustrate the distinction clearly or to force us to 
recognise its existence. 
The point is best made in response to Olsaretti’s own interpretation of the case of the baby 
in the pool. Suppose that we agree both that I am due praise for my action and that I should 
receive compensation for the loss of my wristwatch. To provide support for Scanlon’s 
distinction (and the proposed use of it to show that we do consider some moral choices 
non-voluntary), we must also agree that the most plausible reason for awarding compensation 
is that I was not responsible (in some sense) for my action and the loss thence ensuing. 
However, arguing by appeal to the best explanations of our intuitions in these cases is both 
unilluminating and inconclusive. Instead of the explanation given above (which suggests that 
our intuition about compensation would support the claim that I wasn’t responsible for the 
moral choice I made to save the baby), why not say that it is evidence for some other latent 
moral principle? Why not argue that the best explanation of our intuitions is that we believe 
simply that it is right to rectify losses that come about as a result of morally required actions? 
Or, why not say that the case provides support for an indirectly consequentialist position: we 
must rectify losses like this because it would make myself and other people less likely to 
hesitate in saving babies in the future? My point here is not to argue for either of these as the 
correct interpretation of the case. Rather, it is to indicate that the plethora of alternative 
explanations shows how inconclusive the appeal to intuitions is inevitably going to be. Unless 
we are given good prior reason to believe that the appeal to Scanlon’s distinction is the best 
explanation in these cases, the defence fails: but for that reason, the cases cannot be appealed 
to as support for the distinction itself.  
My third response is this: even if we bolster the appeal to Scanlon’s distinction, this is still 
nothing more than an invitation to bite the bullet. We are still asked to accept that there is a 
sense in which moral choice is ipso facto non-voluntary, and we are justified in declining the 
invitation if we consider that doing so stretches the notion of non-voluntariness beyond 
recognition. I would suggest that it does, and that the Scanlonian response provides an 
inadequate alternative to my revised theory, according to which only prudential unacceptability 
is relevant to assessments of voluntariness. 
  
4 Moral blackmail 
 
Having pointed to problems with the view that morally required acts might be characterised as 
non-voluntary, I conclude by considering a problem with the view I favour. The criticism is 
that we can be morally blackmailed: sometimes an option being morally unacceptable might 
seem to undermine voluntariness by making it necessary for us to choose something otherwise 
                                                 
28 Aristotle [2000]: p.38.  
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unpalatable. Hence, there might be some cases of non-voluntariness which my revised theory 
fails to account for.  
Suppose we consider someone — call him Carlos — who takes a farm job with regular 
exposure to dangerous pesticides because he will starve if he doesn’t. According to my revised 
definition of unacceptability, Carlos’ choice is non-voluntary: he acted to avoid prudentially 
unacceptable alternatives.29
 
But suppose that Carlos were to have one extra option: he could go 
to South America and grow coca leaves for the international drug trade in prudentially 
acceptable conditions. However, Carlos refuses the option because it is morally unacceptable 
to contribute to the production of a dangerous drug. My critic could then say: in such a 
situation, just as much as in the case where all alternatives were prudentially unacceptable, we 
say that Carlos acts non-voluntarily in deciding to take the hazardous farm job. My revised 
account implies otherwise; hence, if the criticism is correct, I leave out something important.30
 
 
My suggestion here is that we bite the bullet and accept that Carlos does act voluntarily when 
one of the alternatives is morally unacceptable. I argued above that saying someone acts 
non-voluntarily renders him ineligible for praise or blame. But if praise is deserved anywhere, it 
is in situations like Carlos’, where one resists an attractive but morally unacceptable option. 
This leaves us with two balancing intuitions, at least one of which we must jettison: either we 
can say that Carlos acts non-voluntarily, or we can say that his action is praiseworthy, but not 
both. Of these two, losing the first seems the best option, for the following reason. Why might 
we resist accepting that Carlos’ choice is voluntary? The reason seems to me to be that 
ascriptions of non-voluntariness are used primarily as excusing conditions. If Carlos acts 
non-voluntarily, it means that he oughtn’t to be penalised for his action (as he would be, for 
example, if we were to deny him healthcare on the grounds that he has no one to blame for his 
ruined health but himself). However, to say that non-voluntariness is sufficient to excuse him 
is not to say that it is necessary: there may be other excusing conditions, even when his action 
is voluntary. Hence, the existence of the coca farm does (on my account) make Carlos’ action 
voluntary, but that doesn’t imply that we don’t have other reasons to ameliorate the working 
conditions he endures when he chooses not to take the coca option. If the desire for an 
excusing condition explains why we might be tempted to say that Carlos acts non-voluntarily, 
then this discussion ought to be sufficient to defuse the criticism. In which case, we have 
reasons to bite the bullet and claim that Carlos acts voluntarily, in order to avoid more 




In this paper, I have made two points about Olsaretti’s claim that voluntary action is action 
performed not because there are no acceptable alternatives. First, in saying that an action is 
performed because there are no acceptable alternatives, we must be talking about an agent’s 
motivating reasons for that action. This means that an agent’s beliefs about the nature of her 
options are crucial to the question of whether she acts voluntarily or not. In particular, an agent 
might act non-voluntarily if she believes all her options to be unacceptable, even if in fact she 
has several acceptable options; so long as the standard by which she judges her apparent 
options is an appropriate one. Hence, if we want to promote an agent’s opportunities to make 
                                                 
29 Olsaretti takes cases such as Carlos’ to be paradigmatic of free but non-voluntary choice 
(Olsaretti [2004]: pp.119–200). 
30 Thanks to Robert Adams for this objection.  
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voluntary choices, we cannot simply attend to the existence and quality of her options, but 
must also ensure that she is well-informed about them.  
Secondly, I discussed the constraints upon what should count as our objective standard of 
acceptability. Olsaretti hints at, but does not argue for, a standard of well-being. I argued that 
something of this sort is urgently needed, since the main alternative (taking objective 
unacceptability in any sense to be the relevant standard) leads to the unpalatable conclusion 
that many moral choices are non-voluntary merely in virtue of being moral. I went on to 
suggest a principled way in which we might avoid this conclusion, by saying that it is only if 
they are prudentially unacceptable that options are barred from us in the way relevant to 
judgments of voluntariness.31  
                                                 
31 For discussion or comments I thank Robert Adams, Daniel Elstein, Fabian Freyenhagen, 
Hallvard Lillehammer, Serena Olsaretti, and Tom Porter; and audiences in Cambridge, Oxford, 
London, Warwick and Manchester. 
